What’s so great about the 1950s?

Rev. Jim Ryan, PhD — jimryan6885@gmail.com
Community blog: https://maryofmagdala-mke.org/blog
Patrick J. Deneen, a political philosopher from Notre Dame, who announced the death of liberalism in his 2018 book, “Why Liberalism Failed” has proceeded to speculate upon that which best remedies the loss of liberalism’s unrealized promises. You can find that in his 2023 book, “Regime Change: Toward a Postliberal Future.” Deneen belongs to a coterie of thinkers, doers, politicians, and religious leaders who appear to have alit upon J.D. Vance, the current US Vice-President, because, for the time being, Vance stands as the one who follows Trump (absent a third term, I guess.) In this parade of texts Deneen calls upon both political and religious leaders, including Vance, to restore what he calls the pre-liberal classical order.
I confess that Deneen’s vision of a pre-liberal classical order is not my vision. I mean, if he wants to open our minds to an application of the classical philosophical foundation for the modern world, it seems to me that Alasdair MacIntyre (a fellow UND faculty member) already achieved that in his book, “After Virtue.”
Deneen applies this classical (read Platonic/Aristotelian) foundation to the 21st century in which he posits the existence of a postliberal mindset. His whipping post is the latter half of the 20th century. That would start in the 60s and 70s with all that sex, drugs, and rock ‘n roll. Not surprisingly, abortion rights and marriage equality come in for particular derogation. In the American context progressive liberals (contrasted with conservative liberals whom he confusedly categorizes as the Founders in “Why Liberalism Failed”) really come under fire from the professor. I couldn’t get past the Introduction of “Regime Change” without being taken aback by his view on progress.
Progress, on Deneen’s view, is an affront to the common people “who would most immediately find the fruits of that progress not to be beneficial, but destabilizing, disorienting and an affront to their beliefs, practices, and even dignity.” (Intro, xi)
These common people, who he calls the demos, are not only the victims of progressive power, they also fall under the control of the elites who have amassed concentrated money and power, thus paralyzing the demos into inaction. Deneen goes on, “the liberal fear of the demos resulted in a political order that was at its foundations dedicated to the rule of more progressive elites over the threatening demos and, throughout American history, has been impressively effective at preventing the rise of a genuine populist party.” (Intro, xi)
Power over the commoners and fear on the part of elites toward the commoners, according to Deneen goes a long way to explaining the collapse of liberalism. In his view liberals, what he calls Founders and Progressives, demanded displacement of “the instinctual conservatism of the commoners.”
So, when the American population, by significant majorities, supports a woman’s right to choose what happened to their instinctual conservatism? When more than 80% of American Catholic married couples practice artificial birth control are they confused in their conservatism? And when the Irish population, not just a legislative body or a court, voted for marriage equality how did that jibe with the conservative label that is so often applied to old Erin? Has the instinctual conservatism of the commoners been simply duped by elites? How else to explain the actions of the demos?
This idea of instinctual conservatism of the commoners is an ahistorical pipedream perpetrated by out-of-balance academics like Patrick Deneen. A more nuanced and classically connected understanding of the demos can be found in Jacques Ranciere’s work (see “Disagreement: Politics & Philosophy). For Deneen, it seems, the commoners are citizens who make up the demos. For Ranciere politics is that human activity whose basis is equality of all persons. In short, the demos includes everyone regardless of citizenship status. He writes, “The party of the poor embodies nothing other than politics itself as the setting up of a party of those who have no part.” (Disagreement, 14)
Ranciere opens a clear path to explaining socio-political upheavals (e.g. voting for marriage equality and the Occupy Movement) emerging from the demos. Deneen, on the other hand sees elites who fear the demos which is made up of only those who have a part to play in one’s version of political philosophy. If the latter half of the 20th century was the calendar for liberalism’s collapsing in upon itself, then please tell me what was so great about the 1950s?
For those of us raised in the Roman Catholic Church in the 50s and who witnessed the triumphalism of “outside the church there is no salvation” aren’t we glad to see progress? For women who couldn’t open credit card accounts without their husband’s permission, do you suppose that’s a status they would like to return to? And, despite contemporary assaults on Voting Rights and equal representation, who among us wants the return of the Jim Crow South? If the 1950s are to serve as an example of a pre-liberal classical order, I would say Deneen has missed his mark.
The argument Deneen makes about the inherent, inevitable self-destruction of liberalism relies heavily on references to the Federalist Papers written by, among others, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. Their effort on behalf of a strong central government provides Deneen with his roadmap to liberalism’s dead end. Deneen does not give equal mention to the Anti-Federalists in the likes of Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, and (to a lesser degree) Thomas Jefferson. All of the above were grounded in and formed by the same liberal teachings of John Locke. It is quite possible that liberalism’s structure of equal rights, free speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and all the rest, exists in Deneen’s postliberal world. After all, the benefit of calling anything “post-“ is that you get to haul into your new setup what you like about the old one and dispose the rest. But my question is, “Isn’t that just another version of liberalism?” These historical persons and these classical principles still inspire citizen action; even the idea of the demos – apart, of course, from corrupt elites.
Let’s not forget the final statement of the Declaration of Independence which binds those practitioners of liberalism:
“For the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection
of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes,
and our sacred Honor.”
Doesn’t sound like beaten-down, alienated, and elite-suppressed commoners to me.

